Introduction
Ireland is experiencing a deep financial and economic crisis, rooted in a contraction in residential and commercial property markets combined with a sharp decline in economic activity. The crisis is mainly domestic in nature and can be traced to the liberalisation of financial regulation during the 1990s, the adoption of principlesbased regulation during the start of the property boom and expansionary fiscal policy propagated by a series of governments which stoked the property bubble.
Following the crash in property prices, which have fallen by over 50 per cent since its peak, the balance sheets of Irish banks have been severely damaged. Its binge on property related lending has resulted in its capital base being destroyed, and decades of steady progress and integrity eroded in just a few years. Market sentiment, nationally and internationally, is at historic lows, and the share prices of Irish banks have fallen by over 90 per cent since its height in mid-2007. Several banks have been nationalised, merged, and even closed down.
While several articles have dealt broadly with Irish banking crisis and its impact on public finances, [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] only a few 7 have examined the role of financial regulation and supervisory authorities comprehensively. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to examine the regulatory failure associated with the Irish banking crisis.
Particularly, the role and response of the Irish Central Bank, Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA) (financial regulator) and Department of Finance to the property bubble and subsequent crash will be presented. The Irish government's decision to guarantee the private debts of Irish banks in 2008 will also be analysed, in terms of its impact on public finances.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section, we present a brief rationale for financial regulation. It also describes how the theory of institutional design has built-up over time, particularly in relation to the separation of monetary and regulatory functions. In section 3 and 4, we map out the evolution of financial regulation in Ireland. Next, the contribution of failed regulation and otiose institutional structures will be assessed in the context of the Irish banking crisis. We examine the measures which successive governments have taken to support the banking system and their impacts on public finances. Finally we highlight the government's response to its failed regulatory regime and discuss whether this is necessary, or indeed, sufficient.
Literature review: financial regulation
A well-functioning banking system acts as a fulcrum around which the real economy turns by allocating resources, increasing capital formation, stimulating productivity growth and acting as a repository of national savings. 8 However, banking systems are prone to periods of instability 9 resulting in large and expensive consequences to the wider-economy. 10 One of the main contributing factors to these crises, demonstrated in Asia 11 and Sweden 12 in the 1990s, has been a lack of effective government oversight. 13 Therefore, countries have sought to carefully supervise banking institutions in order to limit the probability of systemic crisis and their impacts on the real economy. Regulation has become the favourite interventionist policy tool in this regard. Its economic rationality has been extended in the 1980s beyond financial stability and is now used to address market failures such as customer protection, competition, information asymmetries and moral hazard.
Two main types of regulation have promulgated: conduct of business (CoB) and prudential regulation. Conduct of business regulation focuses on how financial institutions conduct business with their customers. It is necessary due to asymmetries of information between consumers and banks, which is further exacerbated due to the inherent complexity of financial products. In a benign environment, CoB regulation relates to the establishment of guidelines and rules of acceptable behaviour between banking institutions and their customers. It also deals with unsolicited contact, advertising, complaints and, in some jurisdictions, levels of service provision and profitability.
Prudential regulation focuses on the factors that are essential to maintain the stability and well-being of the financial system. Its aim is to minimise the probability of a breakdown in the financial sector and prevent any adverse effects on consumers and the wider-economy. i Similar to conduct of business regulation, prudential regulation is driven by imperfect information. However, this time it relates to lack of information about the stability of financial institutions (or the entire financial system vis-à-vis macroprudential supervision 21 and countries with strong financial regulatory frameworks will tend to be less efficient.
Focusing on this helping-hand/ grabbing-hand taxonomy in the sphere of financial regulation, empirical research provides mixed results. 22 Highly restricted banking systems are associated with lower capital costs, resulting in improved lending and economic growth prospects. [23] [24] [25] In contrast, lightly regulated banks have higher levels of operational efficiency, resulting in lower banking charges for customers. 26 Moreover, Barth et al. 21 have demonstrated that the probability of banking crises increase with levels of regulatory restrictions. While this might not be consistent with conventional wisdom, less regulatory restrictions gives banks the ability to diversify their income sources by engaging in different activities which, in turn, improves their underlying stability.
In terms of the financial institutional structure, historically, prudential and conduct of business regulation have been the responsibility of at least two separate institutions. Prudential regulators have generally significant powers, such as the ability to revoke banking licences from incumbent financial service providers or refuse an application for authorisation for new entrants. They are traditionally located within the supervisory department of a central bank, which in the last number of decades has been given independent powers to buffer against political threats.
Moreover, prudential regulators generally have significant influence in monetary policy decision-making given their financial stability responsibilities. Moreover, many of their goals, such as greater competition, are not necessarily consistent with the holy grail of financial stability. 27 As a result, conduct of business regulation is generally characterised as being piecemeal and insufficient, leading to ineffective supervisory oversight. 28 It wasn't until the mid-1990s, that institutional structure became a major issue in policy debates, as governments began to question whether the efficiency of their regulatory regime could be influenced by the institutional arrangements encompassing
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it. There are a number of reasons behind greater awareness of the importance of institutional structure. Firstly, the emergence of universal banking in the early 1990s, posed significant problems for the traditional regulatory architecture. 28 There were concerns that the fragmented nature of financial markets may not only generate inconsistencies but also result in insufficient oversight of the newly emerging financial conglomerates. 29 [36] [37] [38] have demonstrated that the well-being of the financial system may effect an economy's response to monetary policies.
Ireland has embraced many of these debates, resulting in far-reaching changes to financial regulation in the last number of decades. In the next two section, we describe these changes in more detail, before demonstrating its failure during the 2000s.
Evolution of financial regulation in Ireland
When the Irish Free State emerged in 1922, a sophisticated and well-integrated banking system already existed, providing credit and other banking services in the economy. While, the 1926 Commission of Inquiry into Banking considered creating a central bank type-structure to oversee the Irish financial system, it concluded that this course of action was 'not to be recommended as an immediate expedient' (as cited in 39 ) and, thus, banks were left largely to operate free from government oversight.
Instead, the authority's focus was on the economy, particularly the state of public finances and trade and balance of payments issues. 40 However, this was not atypical for the 1920s, as world governments generally adopted a laissez faire approach to banking, 17 due to systems low probability of failure 10, 41, 42 and the prudent risk management practices adopted by the sector. 43 For example, during the antebellum period in the United States, banks were subject 'to virtually no federal regulations' 17 and yet had average capital ratios of 40 per cent. 44, 45 This decreased to 20 per cent at the turn of the twentieth century, as banks were subjected to greater regulations.
However, this is still much greater than current levels, notwithstanding the development of the regulatory state in the latter half of the 20 th century 46, 47 and a tendency towards verrechtlichung. 48, 49 Despite, the Wall Street Crash and the crisis of confidence in financial markets the passing of various financial directives, the regulatory tools and techniques used by the authority were significantly improved. By the mid-1980s, the Central Bank had created a financial system which was characterised as being one of the most 'intensely regulated' in all developed countries. 50 At that time, an interest rate cartel existed as a key factor inhibiting competition. Moreover, the Central Bank controlled new entrants in the banking sector and entry was practically unattainable except by way of takeover. 51 However, the banking system was totally not free from crisis during this period. In 1985, following the collapse of one of Allied Irish Bank's insurance subsidiary, the Insurance Corporation (ICC) of Ireland, due to poor risk management practices, the government was forced to pump over €500 million into the banking systems to prevent a potential crash. This investment -latter written-off completely -was made despite the crippling level of public debt experienced by the economy during this time (a tale which was repeated 23 years later).
Single financial regulator
Subsequent to the ICC debacle, the pace of development of the Irish banking system 'increased sharply'
1980s. Ironically, many of the regulatory provisions which were designed to protect the stability of the Irish banking system were either removed or relaxed, such as a reduction in liquidity requirements and the removal of explicit sectoral guidelines on credit. 53 In relation to regulatory philosophy, the adoption of principles-based regulation (PBR) by IFSRA was broadly welcomed by both banks and industrial bodies. 4 Under PBR, the regulator set out basic principles or desirable outcomes in a number of different areas such as solvency, governance and consumer protection. It then allowed banks to decide how best to align their corporate objectives with predefined regulatory outcomes. The rationale being, in part, that it's better for consumers to have a relatively small amount of rules followed in spirit rather than a large number of legislative provisions which are followed to the letter but not the spirit. However, the effective application of principles-based regulation (PBR) requires a high degree of mutual trust between participants in the supervisory framework. 59 It does not work with individuals 'who have no principles', according to the chief executive officer of the British financial regulator. 60 Its system of governance relies on self-observing and responsible organisations within its framework. 61 The Irish banking crisis of 2008 and its spill-over effects have raised serious question over principle-based regulation, particularly given prevailing business and cultural environment.
With regard to responsibilities, the government mandated IFSRA to achieve three main goals, firstly, to protect consumer interests, secondly, to build up a regulatory framework that supports the stability of the banking system, and finally, to foster the development of a competitive banking industry in Ireland. Despite concerns that the interests of banks would always trump that of consumers, government policy dictated that 'the public and consumer interest are at one', and that 'prudential supervision and consumer protection are complementary, not conflicting' and the new unified consumer protection structure would be effective in address the principleagency concerns in banking. 62 Regarding stability and macroprudential supervision, both the Central Bank and the financial regulator had 'shared' yet undefined responsibilities to maintain financial stability and develop measures to deal with the negative events of banking crises. 63 Possibly this novel 'belts and braces' approach to financial stability was designed to create extra redundancy in the regulatory system. However, this was contrary to the principles of effective bank supervision by the Bank for International The euphoria surrounding property lending was supported by a number of factors, such as full employment, favourable planning laws, a tax system which was biased towards home ownership and property development, and historically low and even negative real interest rates. 4 Banks funded lending through disproportionately high borrowing from the interbank lending markets, as their deposit accounts could not keep pace with the huge growth in lending they experienced. More worryingly, amid aggressive competition, and pressures to maintain growth levels, the terms associated with lending were loosened to widen the pool of potential customers. 
Sources: Central Bank of Ireland Annual Reports/ Monthly Bulletins (1948-2008).
While these practices increased the Irish banks' profitability, their fortunes became inextricably intertwined with the property sector, resulting in greater vulnerability to market cycles, both nationally and internationally. In retrospect, Ireland was experiencing an old-fashioned asset bubble during this period. where 'well capitalised' and had 'robust cash flows'. 71 The Irish government, for its part, continually defended the practices of banks, the state of the property market and the banking system and failed to take any corrective action during the bubble, believing that 'the Irish banking system is well capitalised and it is in a healthy state'. 72 The Central Bank's appraisal of the state of the Irish banking system was presented in its 2007 financial stability report (FSR) , where it concluded that Irish banks were 'appropriately capitalised' and 'solvent' and the system was well placed 'to cope with emerging issues'. 63 Despite financial turbulence the US subprime mortgage market during mid-2007, it indicated that banks' 'shock-absorption capacity' were 'sufficient' to deal with heightened problems in financial markets. 63 Additionally, through in-house stress testing the Central Bank determined that the Irish banking system remained 'well placed' to 'withstand adverse economic developments' in the short-to-medium term, notwithstanding international financial market fragility. Its sister agency, the financial regulator, formed a similar prognosis. In September 2008, following the state guarantee, its chief executive officer Patrick Neary suggested 'by any estimate' the Irish banking system is 'so well capitalised compared to any banks anywhere across Europe' that it could 'absorb any loans or any impairments'. Interbank rates were set soaring and banking system was seeing substantial outflows of deposits with heightened volatility in funding.
In light of growing concerns about access to credit, the health of its loan book 
Source: National Treasury Management Agency
The real economy has been hit-hard by the banking crisis. There has been a collapse of private credit into the economy, as banks, suddenly unable to access interbank funding, and dependent on liquidity from the ECB to remain nominally solvent, 
Conclusion
Rogoff and Reinhart 1 suggest that following a severe financial crisis, gross domestic product (GDP) per person falls by an average of 9 per cent in two years, the unemployment rate increases by 7 per cent and house prices fall by approximately one third in real terms and take about five years reach its nadir. Concomitantly, real government debt grows by an average of 86% in countries afflicted by financial crises, reflecting a collapse in tax receipts due to a reduction in economic activity.
Therefore, downturns following a banking crisis are typically long and deep. Bank, Patrick Honohan, believes that 'failure was clearly of a systemic nature' rather than related to any one individual or department. In relation to previous financial stability reports (FSRs), Honohan, 7 believes that the 'language of successive FSRs were too reassuring' and did 'little to induce the banks….to adjust their behaviour to avoid the threats that lay ahead. With regard to IFSRA, the authority, itself, has accepted its strategic approach to regulation was inappropriate, suggesting that it was constructed in a 'benign environment' where many of the current issues where not foreseen 83 . Particularly, its reliance on senior managers and directors to construct appropriate risk management systems and internal controls was 'misplaced'. 83 As such, supervisory practice focussed on 'verifying governance and risk management models rather than attempting an independent assessment or risk'. 7 In light of these and other failures, the Minister of Finance at the time suggested that the 'Irish regulatory system badly needs reform' and that 'a root and branch review is required'. However, the International Centre for Monetary and Banking Studies 85 warn against such measures indicating that 'when a regulatory mechanism has failed to mitigate boom or bust cycles, simply reinforcing its basic structure is not likely to be a successful strategy'. As such, the financial regulator and Central Bank were always closely associated, the government's new arrangements will simply formalise this relationship. While combining monetary and supervisory functions tends to result in lower instances of systemic banking crisis, the severity of crises tend to be more pronounced compared to a separated regime. 22 Nevertheless, the banking commission in Ireland is now fully operational with the purpose of restoring public confidence in financial regulation. Financial markets will be watching these developments closely to ensure that the implementation process matches the desired objectives. This is the ultimate test in rebuilding the reputation of the Irish financial supervisory regime and the banking system.
i In its strictness sense, prudential regulation is concerned about the soundness of financial institutions vis-à-vis consumer protection while systemic regulation is concerned about the safety of financial institutions for purely systemic reasons. However, for simplicity purposes, this paper expands the strict definition of prudential regulation to include systemic regulatory considerations.
ii For example, the UK, Japan, South Korea, and Iceland all integrated their regulatory authorities into a unified structure during the 1990s, which were previously the responsibility of a number of specialist authorities and government departments. iii Bank of Ireland was the banker to the government until 31 December 1971. iv The Department of Finance remained responsible for the bank's legal framework. v Gross national product is a better indicator of Ireland's real economic activity given the large prevalence of foreign companies (relative to Irish firms with foreign subsidiaries) who export high valued added goods and services from the economy. vi While, promissory notes are not, strictly speaking, government debt, they are treated as such by the European Statistical Agency (Eurostat). They are debt vehicles issued by the Central Bank of Ireland, and the liability for these notes falls on the individual issuing State. The promissory note repayment structure calls for government borrowing of €3.1 billion plus interest and other capital payments each year to repay these notes over a 10-15 year period at varying interest rates.
